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COMMENTS ON MARKHAM'S NET CAPITAL RULE*
PAUL UHLENHOP**

My congratulations to Professor Markham on his excellent paper
raising a number of important issues that need to be considered with
respect to the net capital rule ("Capital Rule") of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC").' His paper is an excellent academic work and provides a sound basis for a profound discussion of
the complex issues involving the CFTC's Capital Rule. I completely
agree with Professor Markham that the Capital Rule needs to be revisited in a number of respects. Professor Markham does not hesitate
to list the difficulties and the problems, both political and practical,
with respect to changes in the Capital Rule. The purpose of this Commentary is not to criticize Professor Markham's excellent article, but
rather to add my personal insights concerning reform of the Capital
Rule.
Reform of the CFTC Capital Rule is not an easy task. The CFTC
Capital Rule affects and is affected by many issues that complicate
efforts to reform it. Numerous efforts led by United States regulators
are currently under way to establish worldwide capital standards. Professor Markham notes the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
has advanced standards involving the use of risk-based capital requirements for both on- and off-balance sheet risk.2 Likewise, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and CFTC, in the Derivative
Policy Group Report, 3 have accepted on a trial basis the use of riskbased capital evaluations. Professor Markham aptly suggests that reformers of the Capital Rule adopt a risk-based approach; 4 however,
truly successful reform of the Capital Rule only can be achieved after
reformers give careful consideration to all matters that complicate the
rule's reform.
* See Jerry W. Markham, The CFTC Net Capital Rule-Should a More Risk Based
Approach Be Adopted?, 71 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1091 (1996).

** Paul B. Uhlenhop is a partner in the law firm of Lawrence, Kamin, Saunders &
Uhlenhop, Chicago, Illinois, and is a member of the bars of the State of Illinois and the State of
New York.

1. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1996).
2. See Markham, supra note *, at 1097-98.
3. See Derivative Policy Group Report, Framework for Voluntary Oversight, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 85,607 (March 1995).
4. See Markham, supra note *, at 1104.
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One of the major problems affecting efforts to reform the Capital
Rule is the existence, in today's world, of futures commission
merchants ("FCMs"). Almost all FCMs of any size are also broker5
dealers. As a result, FCMs are subject to both the net capital rule
and reserve rule 6 of the SEC. Reform of the CFTC's Capital Rule
would require for all practical purposes the SEC's concurrence and
consent because the CFTC's Capital Rule incorporates large parts of
the SEC capital rule 7 and the SEC capital rule, by reason of its Appendix B, incorporates large parts of the CFTC Capital Rule. 8 The
two agencies have worked long and hard to coordinate their respective capital rules, attempting to iron out inconsistencies. However, despite this coordination, gaps and problems still remain.
Other important problems to reform efforts are the ever increasing impact of banks expanding into all financial services, and the
globalization of financial services. Today many banks or their holding
companies own FCMs and broker-dealers. Bank regulatory authorities impose capital requirements in addition to the capital requirements of the SEC and the CFTC. Furthermore, the business of
today's futures industry is worldwide. Today many FCMs operate in
various countries throughout the world, sometimes through separate
subsidiaries, but at other times through branches not incorporated in
the particular jurisdiction. Thus, a financial services entity may be
subject to the conflicting capital rules of various domestic and foreign
regulators. Due to these problems, attempting to comply with various
conflicting capital requirements is a difficult, if not impossible, job.
Consequently, reformers of the CFTC Capital Rule should take into
consideration the rule's affect on the applicable capital rules of major
world financial centers, as well as those of the SEC and of the banking
regulators.
Any revision of the CFTC Capital Rule also must include, as Professor Markham remarks, an examination of segregation requirements. 9 The segregation requirements under the CFTC's rules
assume that funds and securities deposited in a quasi-trust with certain
qualified financial institutions will always be there. 10 As shown by the
Barings Bank fiasco," this assumption may be entirely wrong, not
5. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15(c)3-1 (1996).
6. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15(c)3-3 (1996).

7. See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(c)(5)(vii) (1996).
8. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15(c)3-lb (1996).
9. See Markham, supra note *, at 1100.
10. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.20-1.30 (1996).
11. See The Collapse of Barings; A Fallen Star, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 1995, at 19.
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only in foreign countries, but also in the United States as well. In the
event of a bank's failure, segregated funds and securities of FCM customers may be in jeopardy. Thus, such funds or securities should not
be available for general creditors. Reform of the Capital Rule, consequently, should encourage legislation protecting funds and securities
held in segregation by banks for customers of other domestic and foreign financial institutions.
Professor Markham's remarks about the disincentive, under the
Capital Rule, for an FCM to hold customer funds is also a point of
concern that regulators should address. 12 Under the current Capital
Rule an FCM holding customer funds and securities increases its capital requirement. 13 Thus, the CFTC's Capital Rule certainly gives an
FCM incentive to return customer funds in excess of minimum margin
requirements-by holding customer funds, the amount in segregation
increases, correspondingly increasing an FCM's capital requirements.
One might argue that, for customer protection, the less customer
funds passing through the hands of an FCM, the better. But if a large
customer defaults and the FCM's capital is not adequate, other FCM
customers may suffer.
Professor Markham's suggestions concerning this problem are
worthy of further consideration, but face certain practical problems.
Professor Markham suggests a more risk-based capital rule founded
on minimum margin requirements for both customer and proprietary
accounts. 14 Under this proposal, FCMs would be required to set aside
a percentage of the contract-market minimum margin requirements as
a reserve for meeting customer deficits. Since margins are set using a
sophisticated risk-based analysis, this proposal would relate capital to
risk. Furthermore, the percentage of the margin would be based on
the volatility of specific positions. The reserve requirement would be
reduced on an individual account basis by excess customer funds, and
increased by a charge for concentration positions. Additionally, under
Professor Markham's proposal, a certain percentage of excess customer funds and securities in segregation could be used to meet minimum capital requirements.
Such a rule, on its face, would eliminate the built-in disincentive
for an FCM to urge its customers to withdraw excess funds. Thus, the
rule would force an FCM either to put its own capital at risk for the
12. See Markham, supra note *, at 1103.
13. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1996).
14. See Markham, supra note *, at 1106.
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customer-margin reserve, or induce customers to leave excess funds
with it. I doubt, however, based on personal experience, that either
institutions or sophisticated customers would willingly maintain excess
funds at an FCM. First of all, some entities, like investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, are not
allowed under their governing statutes to keep their excess funds with
an FCM. 15 Additionally, competitive pressures being what they are
and the market being a largely institutional one lead me to believe
that most institutions would not keep excess funds with an FCM.
Many institutions today keep no funds with an FCM above the absolute minimum margin requirement, rather they move any gain or loss
in or out of their account each day by wire transfer. Also, Professor
Markham's approach is problematic because this change in the Capital Rule would give a significant competitive advantage to large, wellcapitalized firms. Unless small, less-capitalized firms could induce
customers to leave excess funds with them, they would be, for all practical purposes, frozen out of the market. Finally, this proposal would
probably significantly increase entry barriers to the clearing and carrying of customer accounts, particularly institutional accounts, which are
a very large part of today's market.
16
Professor Markham also considers other risk-based alternatives.
Value-at-risk ("VAR"), a device for measuring net capital requirements, is one such alternative. 17 While the financial services industry
initially has accepted VAR, it is probably too early to accept it across
the board for capital purposes due to the reasons Professor Markham
notes in his article. 8 Another alternative, which appears to be an excellent system for managing risk, is the Standard Portfolio Analysis of
Risk Performance Bond System ("SPAN"). As noted by Professor
Markham, the SPAN system was developed by the Chicago Mercan15. See 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-i et seq. (1996).
16. See Markham, supra note *, at 1104-08. Currently, the Capital Rule requires an FCM's
minimum net capital to be four percent of its segregation amount. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.17(a)(1)(i)(B) (1996). The CFrC probably did not arbitrarily set this four percent requirement. As a historical footnote, it is my understanding that the CFTC's minimum net capital
requirement of four percent of segregated funds evolved from a survey of clearing firms, including members of the Chicago Board of Trade and of other exchanges, at the time the CFTC
Capital Rule was under consideration as a proposed rule. This survey was undertaken by an
outside, independent public accounting firm to determine the percentage relationship of segregated funds to capital at the major clearing firms. The four percent amount was approximately
one-half the amount of capital at FCM's which were considered well capitalized.
17. Value-at-risk is a measuring device that estimates the "maximum potential loss from
assets or derivative positions held by a firm over a given period of time." Markham, supra note
*, at 1107 (citation omitted).

18. See id.

19961

COMMENTS

tile Exchange, and is used by futures exchanges to compute risk levels
in setting margin requirements. 19 Currently, other similar systems are
starting to be used for setting margins.
In summary, the answer to Professor Markham's question,
"Should a More Risk Based Approach Be Adopted?" is an unqualified "yes." How to do it is the more difficult issue. Professor Markham's thought-provoking article presents a long overdue discussion of
issues involving the CFTC's Capital Rule that deserve further
attention.

19. See id. at 1105 n.72.

